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Abstract
In this paper we study a model of intuitionistic higher-order logic which
we call the Muchnik topos. The Muchnik topos may be defined briefly as
the category of sheaves of sets over the topological space consisting of the
Turing degrees, where the Turing cones form a base for the topology. We
note that our Muchnik topos interpretation of intuitionistic mathematics
is an extension of the well known Kolmogorov/Muchnik interpretation of
intuitionistic propositional calculus via Muchnik degrees, i.e., mass prob-
lems under weak reducibility. We introduce a new sheaf representation of
the intuitionistic real numbers, the Muchnik reals, which are different from
the Cauchy reals and the Dedekind reals. Within the Muchnik topos we
obtain a choice principle (∀x∃y A(x, y)) ⇒ ∃w ∀xA(x,wx) and a bound-
ing principle (∀x∃y A(x, y)) ⇒ ∃z ∀x∃y (y ≤T (x, z) ∧ A(x, y)) where
x, y, z range over Muchnik reals, w ranges over functions from Muchnik
reals to Muchnik reals, and A(x, y) is a formula not containing w or z.
For the convenience of the reader, we explain all of the essential back-
ground material on intuitionism, sheaf theory, intuitionistic higher-order
logic, Turing degrees, mass problems, Muchnik degrees, and Kolmogorov’s
calculus of problems. We also provide an English translation of Muchnik’s
1963 paper on Muchnik degrees.
1Simpson’s research was partially supported by the Eberly College of Science at the Penn-
sylvania State University, and by Simons Foundation Collaboration Grant 276282.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Intuitionism and the calculus of problems
1.1.1 Constructivism
In the early part of the 20th century, foundations of mathematics was domi-
nated by Georg Cantor’s set theory and David Hilbert’s program of finitistic
reductionism. The harshest critics of set theory and Hilbert’s program were
the constructivists. Among the various constructivist schools were intuition-
ism, proposed by L. E. J. Brouwer in 1907; predicativism, proposed by Her-
man Weyl in 1918; finitism, proposed by Thoralf Skolem in 1923; constructive
recursive mathematics, proposed by Andrei Andreyevich Markov in 1950; and
Bishop-style constructivism, proposed by Errett Bishop in 1967. Also among the
constructivists were many other prominent mathematicians including Leopold
Kronecker (1823–1891), who is sometimes regarded as “the first constructivist,”
Rene´ Louis Baire (1874–1932), Emile Borel (1871–1956), Nikolai Nikolaevich
Lusin (1883–1950) and Jules Henri Poincare´ (1854–1913). For more about the
various schools of constructivism and their history, see [33] and [34, Chapter 1].
1.1.2 Brouwer’s intuitionism
Intuitionism is a constructive approach to mathematics proposed by Brouwer.
The philosophical basis of intuitionism was spelled out in Brouwer’s 1907 Ph.D.
thesis, entitled “On the foundations of mathematics.” The mathematical con-
sequences were developed in Brouwer’s subsequent papers, 1912–1928.
The following is quoted from [34, Chapter 1].
The basic tenets of Brouwer’s intuitionism are as follows.
1. Mathematics deals with mental constructions, which are imme-
diately grasped by the the mind; mathematics does not consist
in the formal manipulation of symbols, and the use of mathe-
matical language is a secondary phenomenon, induced by our
limitations (when compared with an ideal mathematician with
unlimited memory and perfect recall), and the wish to commu-
nicate our mathematical constructions with others.
2. It does not make sense to think of truth and falsity of a math-
ematical statement independently of our knowledge concerning
the statement. A statement is true if we have a proof of it, and
false if we can show that the assumption that there is a proof
for the statement leads to a contradiction. For an arbitrary
statement we can therefore not assert that it is either true or
false.
3. Mathematics is a free creation: it is not a matter of mentally re-
constructing, or grasping the truth about mathematical objects
existing independently of us.
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In Brouwer’s view, mathematics allows the construction of mathematical
objects on the basis of intuition. Mathematical objects are mental constructs,
and mathematics is independent of logic2 and cannot be founded upon the
axiomatic method. In particular, Brouwer rejected Hilbert’s formalism and
Cantor’s set theory.
An important feature of Brouwer’s work was weak counterexamples, intro-
duced to show that certain statements of classical mathematics are not intu-
itionistically acceptable. A weak counterexample to a statement A is not a
counterexample in the strict sense, but rather an argument to the effect that
any intuitionistic proof of A would have to include a solution of a mathematical
problem which is as yet unsolved.
In particular, the principle of the excluded middle (PEM), A ∨ ¬A, is valid
in classical logic, but to accept it intuitionistically we would need a universal
method for obtaining, for any A, either a proof of A or a proof of ¬A, i.e., a
method for obtaining a contradiction from a hypothetical proof of A. But if
such a universal method were available, we would also have a method to decide
the truth or falsity of statements A which have not yet been proved or refuted
(e.g., A ≡ “there are infinitely many twin primes”), which is not the case. Thus
we have a weak counterexample to PEM.
The above argument shows that PEM is not intuitionistically acceptable.
However, intuitionists may accept certain special cases or consequences of PEM.
In particular, since we cannot hope to find a proof of ¬ (A∨¬A), it follows that
¬¬ (A ∨ ¬A) is intuitionistically acceptable.
Excessive emphasis on weak counterexamples has sometimes created the im-
pression that intuitionism is mainly concerned with refutation of principles of
classical mathematics. However, Brouwer introduced a number of other inno-
vations, such as choice sequences ; see [5, Chapter 3] and [34, Chapters 4 and
12]. After 1912 Brouwer developed what has come to be known as Brouwer’s
program, which provided an alternative perspective on foundations of mathe-
matics, parallel to Hilbert’s program. For more on the history of intuitionism
and Brouwer’s work, see [33] and [34, Chapter 1].
1.1.3 Kolmogorov’s calculus of problems
The great mathematician Andrei Nikolaevich Kolmogorov published two papers
on intuitionism.
In Kolmogorov’s 1925 paper [15]3 he introduces minimal propositional cal-
culus, which is strictly included in intuitionistic propositional calculus. Starting
with minimal propositional calculus, one can add A ⇒ (¬A ⇒ B) to get in-
tuitionistic propositional calculus, and then one can add (¬¬A) ⇒ A to get
classical propositional calculus. Furthermore, a propositional formula A is clas-
sically provable if and only if ¬¬A is intuitionistically provable. This transla-
tion of classical to intuitionistic propositional calculus, due to Kolmogorov [15],
predates the double-negation translations of Go¨del and Gentzen.
2On the contrary, logic is an application or part of mathematics (according to Brouwer).
3See also the English translation [16].
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In Kolmogorov’s 1932 paper [14]4 he gives a natural but non-rigorous inter-
pretation of intuitionistic propositional calculus, called the calculus of problems.
Each proposition is regarded as a problem, and logically compound propositions
are obtained by combining simpler problems. If A and B are problems, then:
1. A ∧B is the problem of solving both problem A and problem B;
2. A ∨B is the problem of solving either problem A or problem B;
3. A ⇒ B is the problem of solving problem B given a solution of problem
A, i.e., of reducing problem B to problem A; and
4. ¬A is the problem of showing that problem A has no solution;
but Kolmogorov does not give a rigorous definition of “problem.” For further
discussion of these papers of Kolmogorov, see [3].
Arend Heyting was one of Brouwer’s principal students. His primary con-
tribution to intuitionism was, ironical as it may sound, the formalization of
intuitionistic logic and arithmetic. Heyting also proposed what is now called
the proof interpretation for intuitionistic logic. In this interpretation, the mean-
ing of a proposition A is given by explaining what constitutes a proof of A,
and proofs of a logically compound A are explained in terms of proofs of its
constituents. A version of this interpretation is described in [34, Chapter 1].
While Kolmogorov’s and Heyting’s work were independent of each other,
they both acknowledged similarities between the calculus of problems and the
proof interpretation. However, they regarded these respective interpretations
as distinct. Later, in 1958, Heyting insisted that the two interpretations are
practically the same and also extended them to predicate calculus. Since then,
the two interpretations have been treated as the same and are widely known as
the Brouwer/Heyting/Kolmogorov or BHK interpretation. However, as pointed
out in [7], there are subtle differences between the two.
1.1.4 Other interpretations of intuitionism
Some other interpretations of intuitionistic propositional and predicate calculus
are as follows:
• Algebraic semantics, widely known as Heyting algebra semantics, were
probably first used by Stanis law Jas´kowski in 1936.
• Topological semantics were implicit in Marshall Harvey Stone’s work pub-
lished in 1937 and were introduced explicitly by Alfred Tarski in 1938.
• Beth models were introduced by Evert Willem Beth in 1956.
• Kripke models were introduced by Saul Aaron Kripke in 1965.
4See also the English translation [17].
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These interpretations provide a great many models of intuitionism with widely
varying properties. Experts will recognize that our Muchnik topos may be
viewed from various perspectives as a Kripke model, a topological model, and
a Heyting algebra model.
1.2 Higher-order logic and sheaf semantics
1.2.1 Higher-order logic
Higher-order logic is a kind of logic where, in addition to quantifiers over objects,
one has quantifiers over pairs of objects, sets of objects/pairs, sets of sets of
objects/pairs, functions from objects to objects, functions from functions to
functions, and so on. This augmentation of so-called first-order logic increases
its expressive power and is a useful framework for certain foundational studies.
Higher-order logic calls for a many-sorted or typed language. In Subsec-
tion 2.2 below, we provide a detailed definition of the language of higher-order
logic. This language together with appropriate axioms and rules of inference
is sufficiently rich to permit the development of virtually all of intuitionistic
mathematics.
1.2.2 Sheaf semantics for intuitionistic higher-order logic
Sheaf theory originated in the mid-20th century in a geometrical context. Subse-
quently it spread to many branches of mathematics including complex analysis,
algebraic geometry, algebraic topology, differential equations, algebra, category
theory, mathematical logic, and mathematical physics. Sheaf theory may be
viewed as a general tool which facilitates passage from local properties to global
properties. For more on the history of sheaf theory, see Gray [11].
The connection between sheaves and intuitionistic higher-order logic came
from several sources. An important source was Dana Scott’s topological model
of intuitionistic analysis [27, 28]. Another important source was category theory,
an abstract approach to mathematics which was introduced by Samuel Eilenberg
and Saunders Mac Lane in the context of algebraic topology. For an introduc-
tion to category theory, see [21]. Alexander Grothendieck and his coworkers
gave a general definition of sheaves over sites (rather than merely over topolog-
ical spaces) and were thus led to a class of categories known as Grothendieck
topoi. Francis Lawvere realized that these categories provide enough struc-
ture to interpret intuitionistic higher-order logic. In collaboration with Myles
Tierney, Lawvere developed the notion of elementary topoi, a generalization of
Grothendieck topoi. For more on sites and Grothedieck topoi, see [22] and [34,
Chapters 14, 15]. For more on topos theory in general, see [12, 19].
In this paper we avoid the complications of category theory and topos theory.
Instead we follow the sheaf-theoretic approach of Dana Scott, Michael Fourman,
and Martin Hyland [8, 9, 29]. Subsection 2.1 below provides a definition of the
category Sh(T ) of sheaves over a fixed topological space T . Subsection 2.3
explains how to interpret intuitionistic higher-order logic in Sh(T ).
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1.3 Recursive mathematics and degrees of unsolvability
1.3.1 Constructive recursive mathematics
Constructive recursive mathematics (mentioned above in Subsection 1.1) is a
constructivist school that started in the 1930s. It is based on an informal concept
of algorithm or effective procedure, with the following features.
• An algorithm is a set of instructions of finite size. The instructions them-
selves are finite strings of symbols from a finite alphabet.
• There is a computing agent (human or machine), which can react to the
instructions and carry out the computations.
• The computing agent has unlimited facilities for making, storing, and
retrieving steps in a computation.
• The computation is always carried out deterministically in a discrete step-
wise fashion, without use of continuous methods or analog devices. In
other words, the computing agent does not need to make intelligent deci-
sions or enter into an infinite process at any step.
On this basis, a k-place partial function f :⊆ Nk → N is said to be effectively
calculable if there is an effective procedure with the following properties.
1. Given a k-tuple (m1, . . . ,mk) in the domain of f , the procedure eventually
halts and returns a correct value of f(m1, . . . ,mk).
2. Given a k-tuple (m1, . . . ,mk) not in the domain of f , the procedure does
not halt and does not return a value.
Several formalizations of this informal idea of effectively calculable functions
were developed. Kurt Friedrich Go¨del used the primitive recursive functions
in his famous incompleteness proof in 1931, and then later introduced general
recursive functions in 1934 following a suggestion of Jacques Herbrand. Along
completely different lines, Alonzo Church introduced the λ-calculus, a theory
formulated in the language of λ-abstraction and application, and Haskell Brooks
Curry developed his combinatory logic. The equivalence of λ-calculus with com-
binatory logic was proved by John Barkley Rosser, Sr. The equivalence of the
Herbrand/Go¨del recursive functions with the λ-definable functions was proved
by Church and by Stephen Cole Kleene in 1936.
Alan Turing in 1936–1937 defined an interesting class of algorithms, now
called Turing machines, and argued convincingly that the class of effectively
calculable functions coincides with the class of functions computable by Turing
machines. Independently of Turing, Emil Leon Post developed a mathemati-
cal model for computation in 1936. The Church/Turing thesis, also known as
Church’s thesis, states that for each of the above formalisms, the class of func-
tions generated by the formalism coincides with the informally defined class
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of effectively calculable functions. This was proposed in 1936 and is now al-
most universally accepted, although no formal proof is possible, because of the
non-rigorous nature of the informal definition of effective calculability.
The study of constructive recursive mathematics was continued by Markov
and his students. Again, the functions computable by Markov algorithms were
shown to be the same as the Herbrand/Go¨del recursive functions and the Tur-
ing computable functions. Markov’s approach to recursive mathematics was
constructive, but he explicitly accepted the following consequence of PEM:
“If it is impossible that an algorithmic computation does not termi-
nate, then it does terminate.”
This principle, known as Markov’s principle, was rejected by the intuitionists.
We comment further on Markov’s principle in Subsection 3.2 below.
As noted in [33], the discovery of precise definitions of effective calculability
and the Church/Turing thesis in the 1930’s had no effect on the philosophical
basis of intuitionism. Each of these definitions describes algorithms in terms
of a specific language, which is contrary to Brouwer’s view of mathematics as
the languageless activity of the ideal mathematician. Turing’s analysis is not
tied to a specific formalism, but his arguments are based on manipulation of
symbols and appeals to physical limitations on computing. Such arguments are
incompatible with Brouwer’s idea of mathematics as a free creation.
Our discussion above is based on [34, Chapter 1] and on [6, 26, 33].
1.3.2 Unsolvable problems and Turing degrees
A convincing example of a function which is not effectively calculable was given
by Turing in 1936 via the halting problem. Turing proved that there is no Turing
machine program which decides whether or not a given Turing machine program
will eventually halt. This was the first example of an unsolvable decision prob-
lem. Soon afterward, many other mathematical decision problems were shown
to be unsolvable, for instance Hilbert’s 10th problem (the problem of deciding
whether a given Diophantine equation has a solution in integers) and the word
problem for groups.
Eventually it became desirable to compare the amounts of unsolvability in-
herent in various unsolvable problems. Informally and vaguely, a problem A is
said to be solvable relative to a problem B if there exists a Turing algorithm
which provides a solution of A given a solution of B. If in addition B is not
solvable relative to A, then B is strictly more unsolvable than A, i.e., problem
B has a strictly greater degree of unsolvability than problem A.
The concept of oracle machines, described by Turing in 1939, gave a means
of comparing unsolvable problems. In 1944 Emil Post introduced the rigorous
notion of Turing reducibility and Turing degrees as a formalization of degrees of
unsolvability associated with decision problems. It was shown that the Turing
degrees form an upper semi-lattice, i.e., a partially ordered set in which any
finite set has a least upper bound. See [6, 26] and Subsection 5.1 below.
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1.3.3 Mass problems
In order to formalize Kolmogorov’s calculus of problems, Yu. T. Medvedev [23]
introduced mass problems. A mass problem is a subset of the Baire space
NN = {f | f : N → N}. A mass problem is identified with its set of solutions.
Informally, to “solve” a mass problem P means to “find” or “construct” an
element of the set P ⊆ NN. Formally, if P and Q are mass problems, P is said
to be strongly reducible or Medvedev reducible to Q, written P ≤s Q, if there
exists an effectively calculable partial functional from the Baire space to itself
which maps each element of Q to some element of P . It can be shown that ≤s is
a reflexive and transitive relation on the powerset of NN. The strong degree or
Medvedev degree of a mass problem P , denoted degs(P ), is the equivalence class
consisting of all mass problemsQ which are strongly equivalent to P , i.e., P ≤s Q
and Q ≤s P . Following Kolmogorov’s ideas [14] concerning the calculus of
problems, Medvedev proved rigorously that the collection of all strong degrees,
denoted Ds, is a model of intuitionistic propositional calculus.
Later Albert Abramovich Muchnik [24]5 introduced a variant notion of re-
ducibility for mass problems, known as weak reducibility orMuchnik reducibility.
A mass problem P is said to be weakly reducible to a mass problem Q, written
P ≤w Q, if for each g ∈ Q there exists an effectively calculable partial functional
which maps g to some f ∈ P . Again, ≤w is a reflexive and transitive relation
on the powerset of NN. The weak degree or Muchnik degree of a mass problem
P , denoted degw(P ), is the equivalence class consisting of all mass problems Q
which are weakly equivalent to P , i.e., P ≤w Q and Q ≤w P . Still following Kol-
mogorov [14], Muchnik proved that the collection of all weak degrees, denoted
Dw, is a model of intuitionistic propositional calculus.
Thus each of Dw and Ds provides a rigorous implementation of Kolmogorov’s
non-rigorous calculus of problems. Muchnik [24] says that the difference between
weak and strong reducibility of mass problems is analogous to the difference
between proving the existence of a solution of a differential equation versus
effectively finding such a solution.
Subsection 5.1 below provides further details on mass problems and Muchnik
degrees. For a more extensive discussion, see [31]. For more on Muchnik degrees
and their relationship to intuitionistic propositional calculus, see [18, 30, 32].
The purpose of this paper is to extend Muchnik’s interpretation of intuition-
istic propositional calculus to intuitionistic higher-order logic. The extension is
defined in terms of a sheaf model based on the Muchnik degrees. We call our
sheaf model the Muchnik topos. We feel that our study of the Muchnik topos
helps to strengthen the connection between two important subjects, intuitionism
and degrees of unsolvability.
There is another line of research, known as realizability, which was initiated
by Kleene in 1945 [13] and further developed by other researchers, especially
Martin Hyland and Jaap van Oosten. Both the realizability interpretation and
our Muchnik topos interpretation provide close connections between intuition-
ism and recursion theory. However, these two interpretations are quite different.
5An English translation of Muchnik’s paper is included as an appendix to this paper.
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One may draw the following analogy:
Medvedev reducibility
realizability topos
=
Muchnik reducibility
Muchnik topos
.
For a historical account and survey of realizability, see [36]. For recent work on
the realizability topos, see [20, 37].
1.4 Outline of this paper
The plan of this paper is as follows.
Sections 2 through 4 consist of background material concerning sheaf models
and intuitionism. In Section 2 we describe sheaves (a.k.a., sheaves of sets) over
topological spaces, and we explain how the sheaves over any fixed topological
space form a model of intuitionistic higher-order logic. In Section 3 we discuss
sheaf models over topological spaces of a particular kind, namely, poset spaces.
We also discuss a choice principle which fails in some sheaf models but which
holds in sheaf models over poset spaces and over the Baire space. In Section 4
we explain how the various number systems and the Baire space are standardly
represented as sheaves within sheaf models of intuitionistic mathematics.
The heart of this paper is Section 5. In Subsection 5.1 we review the defini-
tions of Turing degrees and Muchnik degrees, and we note that Muchnik degrees
can be identified with upwardly closed sets of Turing degrees. We then define
the Muchnik topos to be the sheaf model over the poset of Turing degrees. In
Subsection 5.2 we introduce a new representation of the intuitionistic real num-
ber system, which we call the Muchnik reals. The idea is that a Muchnik real
“comes into existence” only when we have enough Turing oracle power to com-
pute it. In Subsection 5.3 we prove a choice principle and a bounding principle
for the Muchnik reals. Thus it emerges that intuitionistic analysis based on the
Muchnik reals bears some formal similarity to recursive analysis.
In an Appendix we provide an English translation of Muchnik’s paper [24].
This is the paper where Muchnik defined the Muchnik degrees and used them
to interpret intuitionistic propositional calculus along the lines which had sug-
gested by Kolmogorov. This paper [24] is important for us, because our Muchnik
topos interpretation may be viewed as a natural extension of Muchnik’s interpre-
tation, from intuitionistic propositional calculus [24, Section 1] to intuitionistic
mathematics as a whole.
2 Sheaves and intuitionistic higher-order logic
In this section we provide background material on sheaf theory and intuitionistic
higher-order logic. Our main references are [1] and [34, Chapter 14].
2.1 Sheaves over a topological space
Definition 2.1. Let T be a topological space. Let Ω = {U ⊆ T | U is open}.
A sheaf over T is an ordered triple M = (M,EM , ↿M ) (we omit the subscripts
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on E and ↿ when there is no chance of confusion), where M is a set and E and
↿ are functions, E :M → Ω and ↿ :M ×Ω→M , with the following properties.
1. a ↿ E(a) = a for all a ∈M .
2. E(a ↿ U) = E(a) ∩ U for all a ∈M and all U ∈ Ω.
3. (a ↿ U) ↿ V = a ↿ (U ∩ V ) for all a ∈M and all U, V ∈ Ω.
4. M is partially ordered by letting a ≤ b if and only if a = b ↿ E(a).
5. Say that a, b ∈M are compatible if a ↿ E(b) = b ↿ E(a). Say that C ⊆M
is compatible if the elements of C are pairwise compatible. Then, any
compatible set C ⊆M has a supremum or least upper bound with respect
to ≤, denoted supC. That is, for all d ∈M we have supC ≤ d if and only
if a ≤ d for all a ∈ C.
Elements of a sheaf M are called sections of M . A global section is a section a
such that E(a) = T . The operations E and ↿ are called extent and restriction
respectively. Thus, for any a ∈ M and U ∈ Ω, E(a) ∈ Ω is the extent of a and
a ↿ U ∈M is the restriction of a to U .
Example 2.2. A good example of a sheaf over T is
Co(T,X) = {a : dom(a)→ X | dom(a) ∈ Ω, a is continuous}
where X is any topological space, with E and ↿ given by E(a) = dom(a) = the
domain6 of a, and a ↿ U = a ↾ U = the restriction of a to U ∩ dom(a) ∈ Ω.
Example 2.3. Ω itself is a sheaf over T , with E(U) = U and U ↿ V = U ∩ V
for all U, V ∈ Ω. Note that Ω ∼= Co(T, {0}) where {0} is the one-point space.
Example 2.4. Let T and Ω be as in Definition 2.1. We define
Ω1 = {(V, U) | V, U ∈ Ω, V ⊆ U}
with E and ↿ given by E((V, U)) = U and (V, U) ↿W = (V ∩W,U ∩W ) for all
(V, U) ∈ Ω1 and all W ∈ Ω. It can be shown that Ω1 is a sheaf over T . In fact,
Ω1 ∼= Co(T, S) where S is the Sierpin´ski space, i.e., the topological space {0, 1}
with open sets ∅, {1}, {0, 1}. For details see [1, pages 16–17].
Definition 2.5. Let (M,EM , ↿M ) and (N,EN , ↿N ) be sheaves over T . We say
that (N,EN , ↿N ) is a subsheaf of (M,EM , ↿M ) if N ⊆ M and EN and ↿N are
inherited from M , i.e., EN (a) = EM (a) and a ↿N U = a ↿M U for all a ∈ N
and all U ∈ Ω.
Example 2.6. Let X be a topological space. A function a from a subset of T
into X is said to be locally constant if for every t ∈ dom(a) there exists an open
6For any function a we write dom(a) = the domain of a, and rng(a) = the range of a.
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set V ∈ Ω such that t ∈ V and a is constant on V ∩ dom(a). Clearly locally
constant functions are continuous. Let
Clco (T,X) = {a ∈ Co(T,X) | a is locally constant}.
Then Clco (T,X) is a subsheaf of Co(T,X). However,
Cco(T,X) = {a ∈ Co(T,X) | a is constant}
is in general not a sheaf, hence not a subsheaf of Clco (T,X).
Lemma 2.7. Let M be a sheaf over T .
1. For all a, b ∈M , if a ≤ b then E(a) ⊆ E(b).
2. If C is a compatible subset of M , then c = supC if and only if E(c) =⋃
a∈C E(a) and a ≤ c for all a ∈ C.
3. If {Ui | i ∈ I} is a family of open subsets of T , and if c ∈ M , then {c ↿
Ui | i ∈ I} is a compatible subset of M and supi∈I(c ↿ Ui) = c ↿
⋃
i∈I Ui.
4. Every bounded subset of M is compatible and has a least upper bound.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. See [1, pages 13–16].
Definition 2.8. Let M and N be sheaves over T .
1. The product sheaf is
M ×N = {(a, b) | a ∈M, b ∈ N, E(a) = E(b)}
with E and ↿ given by E((a, b)) = E(a) and (a, b) ↿ U = (a ↿ U, b ↿ U).
2. For all U ∈ Ω the restriction sheaf is
M ↿ U = {a ↿ U | a ∈M} = {a ∈M | E(a) ⊆ U},
with E and ↿ inherited from M .
3. A sheaf morphism M
ϕ
→ N is a mapping ϕ :M → N satisfying E(ϕ(a)) =
E(a) and ϕ(a ↿ U) = ϕ(a) ↿ U for all a ∈M and all U ∈ Ω.
4. The function sheaf is
NM = {(ϕ,U) | U ∈ Ω, M ↿ U
ϕ
→ N ↿ U}
with E and ↿ defined by E((ϕ,U)) = U and (ϕ,U) ↿ V = (ϕ ↿ V, U ∩ V )
where (ϕ ↿ V )(a) = ϕ(a) ↿ V for all a ∈M ↿ (U ∩ V ) and all V ∈ Ω.
Remark 2.9. It can be shown that the product sheaf, the restriction sheaf, and
the function sheaf are indeed sheaves over T . For details see [1, pages 20–28].
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Definition 2.10. For any sheaf M we define the power sheaf P (M) to be the
function sheaf ΩM1 where Ω1 is as in Example 2.4.
Remark 2.11. An alternative definition of the power sheaf appears in [9, 34].
It can be shown that this alternative definition is equivalent to our Definition
2.10. For details see [1, pages 28–35].
Theorem 2.12. For any sheaf M there is a natural one-to-one correspondence
between the subsheaves of M and the global sections of P (M).
Proof. See [1, pages 35–39].
Remark 2.13. Given a topological space T , let Sh(T ) be the category whose
objects are the sheaves over T and whose morphisms are the sheaf morphisms
over T . The category Sh(T ) is one of the most basic examples of a topos.
2.2 The language of higher-order logic
We now describe a many-sorted language L for intuitionistic higher-order logic.
Definition 2.14. The language L is defined as follows.
1. The sorts of L are generated as follows.
(a) There is a collection of ground sorts.7
(b) If σ and τ are sorts, then so is σ × τ , the product sort of σ and τ .
(c) If σ and τ are sorts, then so is σ → τ , the function sort from σ to τ .
(d) If σ is a sort, then so is Pσ, the power sort of σ.
2. The symbols of L are:
(a) for each sort σ, an infinite supply of variables xσ, yσ, . . .;
(b) for each sort σ, an existence predicate Eσ of type (σ), an equality
predicate =σ of type (σ, σ) , and a membership predicate ∈σ of type
(σ, Pσ);
(c) for all sorts σ and τ , a pairing operator piσ,τ of type (σ, τ, σ× τ) and
projection operators piσ,τ1 and pi
σ,τ
2 of types (σ × τ, σ) and (σ × τ, τ)
respectively, and an application operator Ap σ,τ of type (σ → τ, σ, τ);
(d) propositional connectives ¬ ,∧,∨,⇒,⇔;
(e) quantifiers ∀, ∃.
When there is no danger of confusion, we may omit superscripts indicating
sorts and types.
3. The terms of L are generated as follows.
7A.k.a., basic sorts or primitive sorts.
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(a) Each variable of sort σ is a term of sort σ.
(b) If s and t are terms of sort σ and τ respectively, and if pi is of type
(σ, τ, σ × τ), then pist is a term of sort σ × τ .
(c) If r is a term of sort σ × τ , and if pi1, pi2 are of type (σ × τ, σ) and
(σ × τ, τ) respectively, then pi1r and pi2r are terms of sort σ and τ
respectively.
(d) If s and t are terms of sort σ and σ → τ respectively, and if Ap is of
type (σ → τ, σ, τ), then Ap ts is a term of sort τ . We usually write
ts instead of Ap ts.
4. The atomic formulas of L are:
(a) r = s, where r and s are terms of sort σ and = is of type (σ, σ);
(b) s ∈ t, where s and t are terms of sort σ and Pσ respectively, and ∈
is of type (σ, Pσ);
(c) Es, where s is a term of sort σ and E is of type (σ).
5. The formulas of L are generated as follows.
(a) Each atomic formula is a formula.
(b) If A,B are formulas then so are ¬A, A∧B, A∨B, A⇒ B, A⇔ B.
(c) If A is a formula and x is a variable, then ∀xA and ∃xA are formulas.
Definition 2.15. The complexity of a formula A is the number of occurrences of
propositional connectives ¬ ,∧,∨,⇒,⇔ and quantifiers ∀, ∃ in A. An occurrence
of a variable xσ in A is said to be bound in A if it is within the scope of a
quantifier ∀xσ or ∃xσ in A. A variable xσ is said to be free in A if at least one
occurrence of xσ in A is not bound in A. A formula A is called a sentence if no
variables are free in A.
Remark 2.16. For a more extensive discussion, see [35]. We could include ad-
ditional predicates and operators in L, but they are not needed for our purpose.
2.3 Sheaf models of intuitionistic mathematics
In this subsection we explain how sheaves over topological spaces provide models
of intuitionistic higher-order logic and intuitionistic mathematics.
Definition 2.17. Let T be a topological space. Let µ be a mapping which
assigns to each ground sort σ of L a sheaf Mσ over T . We inductively extend
µ to the compound sorts of L by letting Mσ×τ = Mσ ×Mτ (product sheaf),
Mσ→τ = M
Mσ
τ (function sheaf), and MPσ = P (Mσ) (power sheaf). For each
sort σ of L and each section a ∈Mσ, we extend L by adding a constant symbol
a = aσ of sort σ, which is now also a term of sort σ. The extended language is
denoted L(µ). A term of L(µ) is said to be closed if it contains no variables.
Definition 2.18. To each L(µ)-sentence A we assign a truth value JAK ∈ Ω.
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1. To each closed L(µ)-term s of sort σ, we assign a value JsK ∈Mσ.
(a) If a ∈Mσ let JaK = a.
(b) If s and t are closed terms of sorts σ and τ respectively, let JpistK =
(JsK ↿ E(JtK), JtK ↿ E(JsK)).
(c) If r is a closed term of sort σ × τ , then JrK = (a, b) for some (a, b) ∈
Mσ ×Mτ and we let Jpi1rK = a and Jpi2rK = b.
(d) Suppose t is a closed term of sort σ → τ with JtK = (ϕ,U) ∈ MMστ .
If s is a closed term of sort σ, let JAp tsK = JtsK = ϕ(JsK ↿ U).
2. For atomic L(µ)-sentences A, we define JAK ∈ Ω as follows.
(a) If r and s are closed terms of sort σ, let
Jr = sK =
⋃
{U ∈ Ω | U ⊆ E(JrK) ∩ E(JsK), JrK ↿ U = JsK ↿ U}.
(b) If s is a closed term of sort σ, let JEσsK = Js = sK = E(JsK).
(c) If s is a closed term of sort σ and t is a closed term of sort Pσ with
JtK = (ϕ,U) ∈ P (Mσ) = Ω
Mσ
1 , let Js ∈ tK = V where ϕ(JsK ↿ U) =
(V,E(JsK) ∩ U).
3. For non-atomic L(µ)-sentences A, we define JAK ∈ Ω by induction on the
complexity of A, using the notation S◦ = interior of S.
(a) Propositional connectives:
J¬AK = (T \ JAK)◦,
JA ∧BK = JAK ∩ JBK, JA ∨BK = JAK ∪ JBK,
JA⇒ BK = (JAK ⇒ JBK) where (U ⇒ V ) = ((T \ U) ∪ V )◦,
JA⇔ BK = JA⇒ BK ∩ JB ⇒ AK.
(b) Quantifiers:
J∃xσ A(xσ)K =
⋃
a∈Mσ
JEa ∧ A(a)K,
J∀xσ A(xσ)K =
( ⋂
a∈Mσ
JEa⇒ A(a)K
)◦
.
Definition 2.19. For L(µ)-sentences A we write Sh(T, µ) |= A to mean that
JAK = T . An L-formulaA is said to be valid for sheaf models if for all topological
spaces T and all µ : σ 7→Mσ as above, Sh(T, µ) |= the universal closure of A.
The following theorem says that the axioms and rules of intuitionistic higher-
order logic are valid for sheaf models. Let IHOL be the formal system of intu-
itionistic higher-order logic as formulated in [29] and [34, Chapter 14].
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Theorem 2.20. The axioms and rules of IHOL are valid for sheaf models.
Proof. See [9, Theorem 7.3] and [34, Theorem 5.15].
For instance, substitution of equals is intuitionistically valid, hence provable
in IHOL, so we have:
Theorem 2.21. Let x be a variable of sort σ, let r and s be closed L(µ)-terms
of sort σ, and let A(x) be an L(µ)-formula with no free variables other than x.
Then Sh(T, µ) |= r = s⇒ (A(r)⇔ A(s)), hence Jr = sK ∩ JA(r)K ⊆ JA(s)K.
Proof. For a much more detailed proof, see [1, pages 42–48].
Remark 2.22. By [9, 34] we know that intuitionistic mathematics is formal-
izable in IHOL. Thus Theorem 2.20 may be viewed as saying that, for any
topological space T , Sh(T ) is a model of intuitionistic mathematics. Such mod-
els are known as sheaf models.
3 Poset spaces and choice principles
In this section we discuss sheaf models over a special class of topological spaces,
the so-called poset spaces. We show that some special cases of the axiom of
choice are valid for sheaf models over poset spaces and over the Baire space.
3.1 Poset spaces
Definition 3.1. A poset8 is a non-empty set K together with a binary relation
≤ on K which is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. A set U ⊆ K is said
to be upwardly closed if for all α ∈ U and β ∈ K, α ≤ β implies β ∈ U .
The upwardly closed subsets of K are the open sets of a topology on K, the
Alexandrov topology. A poset space is a poset endowed with the Alexandrov
topology. The category of sheaves over a poset space K is denoted Sh(K).
Lemma 3.2. Let K be a poset space.
1. For any α ∈ K there is a smallest open set containing α, namely,
Uα = {β ∈ K | α ≤ β}.
2. K is locally connected, i.e., for any α ∈ K and any neighborhood U of α,
there is a connected neighborhood of α included in U .
3. For all families of subsets of K we have
(⋂
i∈I Si
)◦
=
⋂
i∈I S
◦
i .
4. If U is an open subset of K, and if X is a T1 space
9, then every continuous
function f : U → X is locally constant.
8I.e., a partially ordered set.
9A T1 space is a topological space in which every point is a closed set. Examples of T1
spaces are R, N, NN, etc.
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Proof. The proof is straightforward. See [1, pages 50–51].
Definition 3.3. A poset K is said to be directed if for all α, β ∈ K there exists
γ ∈ K such that α ≤ γ and β ≤ γ.
Lemma 3.4. Let U be an upward closed subset in a directed poset K. Let X
be any set. Then, any locally constant function f : U → X is constant.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. See [1, pages 51–52].
3.2 Choice principles over poset spaces
In this subsection we show that sheaf models over poset spaces satisfy certain
special cases of the axiom of choice.
Definition 3.5. Let σ and τ be L-sorts. The axiom of choice for σ → τ ,
denoted AC(σ, τ), is the universal closure of
(∀x∃y A(x, y))⇒ ∃w ∀xA(x,wx)
where x, y, w are variables of sort σ, τ, σ → τ respectively, and A(x, y) is any
L-formula in which w does not occur.
Remark 3.6. Amodel of intuitionistic higher-order logic cannot satisfy AC(σ, τ)
for all sorts σ, τ unless it is also a model of classical higher-order logic. This
is because, as shown in [4], the full axiom of choice implies PEM. However, as
we shall see, models such as Sh(T, µ) may satisfy AC(σ, τ) for some particular
choices of σ and τ .
Definition 3.7. Let T be a topological space, and letX be a set. As in Example
2.6, let Clco (T,X) be the sheaf of locally constant functions from open subsets
of T into X . We define X̂sh = Clco (T,X). Note that for each x ∈ X there is a
global section x̂ of X̂sh which maps T into {x}. The sheaf X̂sh is called a simple
sheaf. See [9] and [34, page 782].
Theorem 3.8. Let K be a poset space. If Mσ is a simple sheaf over K, then
Sh(K,µ) satisfies AC(σ, τ).
Proof. We may safely assume that A(x, y) has no free variables other than x and
y. Letting U = J∀x∃y A(x, y)K, it will suffice to show that U ⊆ J∃w ∀xA(x,wx)K.
Let X be a set such that Mσ = X̂
sh. For each x ∈ X we have x̂ ∈ X̂sh and
E(x̂) = K, hence
U =
 ⋂
a∈X̂sh
(E(a)⇒ J∃y A(a, y)K)
◦
⊆
⋂
x∈X
(E(x̂)⇒ J∃y A(x̂, y)K)
=
⋂
x∈X
J∃y A(x̂, y)K (because E(x̂) = K)
=
⋂
x∈X
⋃
b∈Mτ
(E(b) ∩ JA(x̂, b)K).
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Fix α ∈ U . Using the axiom of choice externally, we choose for each x ∈ X
a bx ∈ Mτ such that α ∈ E(bx) ∩ JA(x̂, bx)K. Since E(bx) ∩ JA(x̂, bx)K is open,
it follows by Lemma 3.2 that Uα ⊆ E(bx) ∩ JA(x̂, bx)K. We shall now define
a sheaf morphism from X̂sh ↿ Uα into Mτ . Let a ∈ X̂sh ↿ Uα be given. For
all x, y ∈ X such that x 6= y we have a−1(x) ∩ a−1(y) = ∅, hence the set
{bx ↿ a
−1(x) | x ∈ X} ⊆Mτ is compatible, hence the least upper bound
ϕ(a) = sup
x∈X
(
bx ↿ a
−1(x)
)
∈Mτ
exists. We have E(a) ⊆ Uα ⊆ E(bx), hence E(ϕ(a)) =
⋃
x∈X E(bx ↿ a
−1(x)) =⋃
x∈X a
−1(x) = E(a) by Lemma 2.7. Moreover, for any open set V ⊆ K
we have ϕ(a ↿ V ) = supx∈X
(
bx ↿ (a ↿ V )
−1(x)
)
= supx∈X
(
bx ↿
(
a−1(x) ∩
V
))
=
(
supx∈X
(
bx ↿ a
−1(x)
))
↿ V = ϕ(a) ↿ V . Thus ϕ preserves extent and
restriction, so we have a sheaf morphism
X̂sh ↿ Uα
ϕ
→Mτ ↿ Uα,
i.e., (ϕ,Uα) ∈M X̂
sh
τ .
We claim that Uα ∩E(a) ⊆ JA(a, (ϕ,Uα)a)K for all a ∈ X̂sh. To see this, fix
β ∈ Uα ∩ E(a). For some x ∈ X we have a(β) = x, hence Uβ ⊆ a
−1(x) ⊆ E(a)
and x̂ ↿ Uβ = a ↿ Uβ, hence Uβ ⊆ Jx̂ = aK. Moreover bx ↿ Uβ = ϕ(a ↿ Uα) ↿ Uβ
and Uβ ⊆ E(bx), hence Uβ ⊆ Jbx = ϕ(a ↿ Uα)K, and clearly Uβ ⊆ Uα ∩ E(a) =
Jϕ(a ↿ Uα) = (ϕ,Uα)aK. Therefore, from Uβ ⊆ JA(x̂, bx)K it follows by Theorem
2.21 that Uβ ⊆ JA(a, (ϕ,Uα)a)K, and this proves the claim.
Our claim easily implies that
Uα ⊆
⋂
a∈X̂sh
(
(K \ E(a)) ∪ JA(a, (ϕ,Uα)a)K
)◦
= J∀xA(x, (ϕ,Uα)x)K.
But then, since E((ϕ,Uα)) = Uα, we have
Uα ⊆ E((ϕ,Uα)) ∩ J∀xA(x, (ϕ,Uα)x)K
⊆
⋃
(ψ,V )∈MX̂sh
τ
(E((ψ, V ) ∩ J∀xA(x, (ψ, V )x)K)
= J∃w ∀xA(x,wx)K.
Since α ∈ U was arbitrary, we conclude that U ⊆ J∃w ∀xA(x,wx)K. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Remark 3.9. Theorem 3.8 fails for sheaf models over arbitrary topological
spaces. In particular, see [1, pages 77–79] and [34, page 788] for a proof that
AC(σ, σ) fails in Sh(R, µ) for Mσ = N̂sh. See also Remark 4.18 below.
18
Remark 3.10. One might think that Theorem 3.8 should hold whenever Mσ
is a subsheaf of a simple sheaf over K. However, the following example shows
otherwise. Let K = {−∞} ∪ {−i | i ∈ N} with the natural linear ordering,
−∞ < −j < −i for all i, j ∈ N with i < j. Let Mσ = Co(K, {0}) ↿ {−i | i ∈ N}.
For all m,n ∈ N let bm,n ∈ Co(K,N) be the constant function with domain
{−i | i < m} and value n. Let Mτ be the subsheaf of Co(K,N) consisting of all
bm,n such that m < n. Note that for each sheaf morphism (ϕ,U) ∈ Mσ→τ we
have U ⊆ {−i | i ∈ N}. Let x, y, w be variables of sort σ, τ, σ → τ respectively.
Easy calculations show that J∀x∃y (y = y)K = K and J∃w ∀x (wx = wx)K =
{−i | i ∈ N}. Thus AC(σ, τ) fails in Sh(K) for the formula A(x, y) ≡ (y = y).
In the vein of Theorem 3.8 and Remark 3.9, we now call attention to another
principle which is valid for sheaf models over poset spaces but not over arbitrary
topological spaces.
Definition 3.11. Let GMP(σ) be the universal closure of
(∀x (A(x) ∨ ¬A(x)) ∧ ¬¬∃xA(x))⇒ ∃xA(x)
where x is a variable of sort σ and A(x) is any L-formula. As will become clear
in Subsection 4.1, GMP(σ) for Mσ = N̂sh amounts to Markov’s principle as
discussed in [34, page 203] and in Subsection 1.3.1 above. Thus GMP(σ) may
be viewed as a generalized Markov principle.
Theorem 3.12. Let K be a poset space. If Mσ is a simple sheaf over K, then
Sh(K,µ) satisfies GMP(σ).
Proof. See [1, pages 71–74].
Remark 3.13. Neither Markov’s principle nor its generalization in Theorem
3.12 holds for sheaf models over arbitrary topological spaces T . In fact, Markov’s
principle fails over T = {0, 1}N = the Cantor space. See [1, pages 69–71].
3.3 Choice principles over the Baire space
Despite Remark 3.9, Theorem 3.8 is valid for for sheaf models over some topo-
logical spaces other than poset spaces. We now show that the Baire space NN
is one such topological space.
Lemma 3.14. Given a collection U of open sets in NN, we can find a collection
V of open sets in NN such that
1.
⋃
V =
⋃
U ,
2. for all V ∈ V there exists U ∈ U such that V ⊆ U , and
3. for all V, V ′ ∈ V , if V 6= V ′ then V ∩ V ′ = ∅.
Proof. For each finite sequence p of natural numbers, let Vp = {f ∈ NN | p is an
initial segment of f}. Given U as in the lemma, let V = {Vp | p minimal such
that ∃U (U ∈ U and Vp ⊆ U)}. Clearly V has the desired properties.
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Theorem 3.15. If Mσ is a simple sheaf over NN, then Sh(NN, µ) |= AC(σ, τ).
Proof. Let X be a set such that Mσ = X̂
sh. As in the proof of Theorem 3.8, let
U = J∀x∃y A(x, y)K and note that
U ⊆
⋂
x∈X
⋃
b∈Mτ
(E(b) ∩ JA(x̂, b)K).
For each x ∈ X apply Lemma 3.14 to get a pairwise disjoint collection Vx of
open sets such that U ⊆
⋃
Vx and for all V ∈ Vx there exists b ∈Mτ such that
V ⊆ E(b) ∩ JA(x̂, b)K. For each V ∈ Vx choose such a b and let bx,V = b ↿ V .
Clearly {bx,V | V ∈ Vx} ⊆Mτ is compatible, so for all a ∈ X̂sh ↿ U define
ϕ(a) = sup
x∈X
sup
V ∈Vx
(
bx,V ↿ a
−1(x)
)
∈Mτ .
The verification that X̂sh ↿ U
ϕ
→ Mτ ↿ U is a sheaf morphism, the proof that
U ∩ E(a) ⊆ JA(a, (ϕ,U)a)K for all a ∈ X̂sh, and the final verification that
U ⊆ J∃w ∀xA(x,wx)K, are similar to the corresponding parts of the proof of
Theorem 3.8. For further details, see [1, pages 80–83].
Remark 3.16. A different proof of Theorem 3.15 for the special caseMσ = N̂sh
is given in [8, page 289] and [34, page 787].
Remark 3.17. Our proof of Theorem 3.15 uses only the property of the Baire
space which is stated in Lemma 3.14. Therefore, Theorem 3.15 holds for sheaf
models over all topological spaces with this property.
4 Sheaf representations of the number systems
Let T be a topological space. In this section we discuss the representation of the
number systems N,Q,R and the Baire space NN within the sheaf model Sh(T ).
4.1 The natural numbers
Recall from Subsection 3.2 that N̂sh = Clco (T,N) where N is the set of natu-
ral numbers. In this subsection we argue that N̂sh is appropriately viewed as
representing the natural number system within Sh(T ).
Definition 4.1. A system is an ordered triple (X, c, f) where X is a set, c ∈ X ,
and f : X → X . A Peano system is a system which satisfies ∀x (fx 6= c) and
∀x∀y (f(x) = f(y)⇒ x = y) and
∀Y ((Y ⊆ X ∧ c ∈ Y ∧ ∀x (x ∈ Y ⇒ f(x) ∈ Y ))⇒ Y = X).
Theorem 4.2. The following familiar facts are intuitionistically valid.
1. Given a Peano system (X, c, f) and a system (X ′, c′, f ′), there is a unique
h : X → X ′ satisfying h(c) = c′ and ∀x (h(f(x)) = f ′(h(x))).
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2. Any two Peano systems are isomorphic.
3. In any Peano system (X, f, c) there are uniquely determined functions
satisfying the primitive recursion equations, identifying c with 0 and f
with the successor function S. In particular, there are uniquely determined
operations + and · on X satisfying
x+ c = x, x+ f(y) = f(x+ y),
x · c = c, x · f(y) = (x · y) + x
for all x, y ∈ X .
Proof. See [34, Chapter 3].
Remark 4.3. We interpret Definition 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 in Sh(T ) by letting
X be a sheaf over T , c a section of X , f : X → X a sheaf morphism, and Y
a section of the power sheaf P (X). By Theorem 2.20 we know that Theorem
4.2 is valid in Sh(T ). Therefore, the following theorem implies that N̂sh is the
“correct” representation of the natural number system as a sheaf over T .
Theorem 4.4. Let T be a topological space. Let 0̂ ∈ N̂sh be the global section
given by 0̂(t) = 0 for all t ∈ T . Let Ŝ : N̂sh → N̂sh be the sheaf morphism given
by (Ŝ(a))(t) = a(t) + 1 for all a ∈ N̂sh and all t ∈ E(a). Then Sh(T ) satisfies
that (N̂sh, 0̂, Ŝ) is a Peano system.
Proof. A detailed proof is in [1, pages 58–61].
Remark 4.5. Similarly, the sheaves in Sh(T ) corresponding to Z, the ring of
integers, and Q, the field of rational numbers, are Ẑsh and Q̂sh respectively. See
also [9, Chapter III] and [34, Chapter 15].
4.2 The Baire space
In this subsection we discuss the representation of the Baire space NN within
Sh(T ). We begin by noting that, since the simple sheaf N̂sh = Clco (T,N) repre-
sents N, the function sheaf N̂shN̂
sh
represents NN.
Theorem 4.6. For any topological space T , Co(T,NN) and N̂shN̂
sh
are isomor-
phic as sheaves over T . Hence Co(T,NN) represents NN within Sh(T ).
Proof. For a detailed proof, see [1, pages 62–64].
Theorem 4.7. If T is locally connected, then Co(T,NN) = Clco (T,N
N), so the
simple sheaf N̂N
sh
= Clco (T,N
N) represents NN within Sh(T ).
Proof. Let U ⊆ T be open. Given a continuous function a : U → NN, for
each i ∈ N define a continuous function ai : U → N by ai(t) = (a(t))(i). If U
is connected, then each ai is constant on U , hence a is constant on U . Since
T is locally connected, it follows that Co(T,NN) = Clco (T,N
N). Therefore, by
Definition 3.7 and Theorem 4.6, Clco (T,N
N) = N̂N
sh
represents NN in Sh(T ).
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Corollary 4.8. For any poset space K, the simple sheaf N̂N
sh
= Clco (K,N
N)
represents NN within Sh(K).
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 K is locally connected, so Theorem 4.7 applies to K.
Remark 4.9. Theorems 4.6 and 4.7 for NN hold more generally, for product
spaces XY where X has the discrete topology. In other words, over any topo-
logical space T the sheaves X̂shŶ
sh
and Co(T,X
Y ) are isomorphic, and if T is
locally connected then Co(T,X
Y ) = Clco (T,X
Y ) = X̂Y
sh
.
4.3 The real numbers
In classical mathematics, the Cauchy reals (real numbers constructed as equiv-
alence classes of Cauchy sequences of rational numbers) and the Dedekind reals
(real numbers constructed as Dedekind cuts of rational numbers) are equiva-
lent. Intuitionistically, they are not necessarily equivalent. In this subsection
we discuss various sheaf models where they are and are not equivalent.
Definition 4.10. Classically, we use R to denote the real number system. Intu-
itionistically, we use RC and RD to denote the Cauchy reals and the Dedekind
reals respectively. In particular, given a topological space T , we use RC and
RD to denote the sheaves in Sh(T ) corresponding to the Cauchy reals and the
Dedekind reals respectively. Recall from Subsection 2.1 that Co(T,X) (respec-
tively Clco (T,X), C
c
o(T,X)) are the sheaves of continuous (respectively locally
constant, constant) functions from open subsets of T into X . If M is any one
these sheaves over T , there is a natural isomorphism of Q̂sh = Co(T,Q) =
Clco (T,Q) onto a subsheaf of M , corresponding to the natural embedding of Q
into R. If M1 and M2 are any two of these sheaves, we say that M1 and M2 are
Q-isomorphic, denoted M1 ∼=Q M2, if there is an isomorphism of M1 onto M2
which commutes with the natural embeddings of Q̂sh into M1 and M2.
Theorem 4.11. Let T be a topological space. Within Sh(T ) we have RD ∼=Q
Co(T,R). Moreover, if T is locally connected then RC ∼=Q Clco (T,R).
Proof. See [8, pages 288–289], [9, pages 384–385], and [34, pages 784–789].
Corollary 4.12. In Sh(R) we have RC 6∼=Q RD.
Proof. R is locally connected, so RC ∼=Q Clco (R,R) and RD ∼=Q Co(R,R). On
the other hand, there are continuous real-valued functions on R which are not
locally constant, e.g., the identity function on R. Thus Clco (R,R) $ Co(R,R),
and from this it follows easily that Clco (R,R) 6∼=Q Co(R,R).
Corollary 4.13. Let K be a poset space. In Sh(K) we have RC ∼=Q RD ∼=Q
Clco (K,R) = Co(K,R). Moreover, Sh(K,µ) satisfies AC(σ, τ) for Mσ = RC .
22
Proof. By Lemma 3.2 K is locally connected and all continuous functions from
open subsets of K into R are locally constant. Thus Theorem 4.11 implies
that RC ∼=Q RD ∼=Q Co(K,R) = Clco (K,R) = R̂
sh. Theorem 3.8 tells us that
Sh(K,µ) satisfies AC(σ, τ) for Mσ = R̂sh, but since RC ∼=Q R̂sh we get the same
conclusion for Mσ = RC .
Corollary 4.14. Let K be a directed poset space. In Sh(K) we have RC ∼=Q
RD ∼=Q Cco(K,R) = C
lc
o (K,R) = Co(K,R).
Proof. This follows from the previous corollary plus Lemma 3.4.
Definition 4.15. The axiom of countable choice is the special case Mσ = N̂sh
of AC(σ, τ) as formulated in Definition 3.5. More formally, for any topological
space T we say that Sh(T ) satisfies AC0 if Sh(T, µ) |= AC(σ, τ) for Mσ = N̂sh
and arbitrary Mτ .
Theorem 4.16. Let T be a topological space. If Sh(T ) satisfies AC0, then
Sh(T ) satisfies RC ∼=Q RD.
Proof. It is known intuitionistically that the axiom of countable choice implies
that the Cauchy reals and the Dedekind reals are isomorphic over Q. Therefore,
by Theorem 2.20, this implication holds in Sh(T ). See also [8, page 289] and
[34, pages 274 and 788–789].
Corollary 4.17. Let T be a locally connected topological space. If Sh(T )
satisfies AC0 then Co(T,R) = Clco (T,R).
Proof. This is immediate from Theorems 4.11 and 4.16.
Remark 4.18. We noted in Remark 3.9 that AC0 fails in Sh(R). Now Corol-
laries 4.12 and 4.17 provide another proof of this fact.
Theorem 4.19. AC0 and RC ∼=Q RD hold in Sh(NN) and in Sh(K) for any
poset space K.
Proof. This is immediate from Theorems 3.8, 3.15, 4.16, and 4.19.
Remark 4.20. There are continuous functions from NN into R which are not
locally constant. Thus NN is an example of a topological space T such that in
Sh(T ) we have RC ∼=Q RD ∼=Q Co(T,R) % Clco (T,R), hence RC 6∼=Q C
lc
o (T,R).
5 The Muchnik topos and the Muchnik reals
In this section we discuss a particular sheaf model which we call the Muchnik
topos. We show that the Muchnik topos provides a model of intuitionistic math-
ematics which is a natural extension of the well known Kolmogorov/Muchnik
interpretation of intuitionistic propositional calculus via mass problems under
weak reducibility, i.e., Muchnik degrees. Within the Muchnik topos we define a
sheaf representation of the real number system which we call the Muchnik reals.
We prove a choice principle and a bounding principle for the Muchnik reals.
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5.1 The Muchnik topos
Definition 5.1. For f, g ∈ NN we say that f is Turing reducible to g, denoted
f ≤T g, if f is computable using g as a Turing oracle. It can be shown that
≤T is transitive and reflexive on NN. We say that f is Turing equivalent to g,
denoted f ≡T g, if f ≤T g and g ≤T f . Clearly ≡T is an equivalence relation
on NN. The Turing degree of f , denoted degT(f), is the equivalence class of f
under ≡T. The set of all Turing degrees is denoted DT. We partially order DT
by letting degT(f) ≤ degT(g) if and only if f ≤T g.
Lemma 5.2. Some well known facts about the poset DT are as follows.
1. There is a bottom Turing degree 0 = degT(f) for computable f ∈ N
N.
2. Any two Turing degrees have a supremum, i.e., a least upper bound, given
by sup(degT(f), degT(g)) = degT((f, g)) where (f, g) ∈ N
N is given by
(f, g)(2i) = f(i) and (f, g)(2i+ 1) = g(i) for all i ∈ N.
3. However, two incomparable Turing degrees may or may not have an infi-
mum, i.e., a greatest lower bound, in DT.
4. Thus DT is an upper semi-lattice, hence a directed poset, but not a lattice.
Definition 5.3. A mass problem is a set P ⊆ NN. For P,Q ⊆ NN we say that
P is weakly reducible to Q, denoted P ≤w Q, if for all g ∈ Q there exists f ∈ P
such that f ≤T g. Clearly ≤w is reflexive and transitive on the powerset of
NN. We say that P is weakly equivalent to Q, denoted P ≡w Q, if P ≤w Q and
Q ≤w P . Clearly ≡w is an equivalence relation on the power set of NN. The
weak degree or Muchnik degree of a mass problem P , denoted degw(P ), is the
equivalence class of P under ≡w. The set of all Muchnik degrees is denoted Dw.
We partially order Dw by letting degw(P ) ≤ degw(Q) if and only if P ≤w Q.
Remark 5.4. There is a natural embedding of the Turing degrees, DT, into
the Muchnik degrees, Dw, given by degT(f) 7→ degw({f}). This embedding is
one-to-one and order-preserving, i.e., f ≤T g if and only if {f} ≤w {g}. More-
over, this embedding preserves the bottom Turing degree and the supremum
of any two Turing degrees. However, it does not preserve the infimum of two
incomparable Turing degrees, even when the infimum exists.
Definition 5.5. A lattice is a poset such that for any two elements a and b
there exists a supremum or least upper bound, sup(a,b), and an infimum or
greatest lower bound, inf(a,b). A lattice is said to be complete if for every set
of elements {ai}i∈I there exists a supremum or least upper bound, supi∈I ai,
and an infimum or greatest lower bound, infi∈I ai. Note that every complete
lattice has a top element and a bottom element. A complete lattice is said to
be completely distributive if it satisfies inf(supi∈I ai,b) = supi∈I inf(ai,b) and
sup(infi∈I ai,b) = infi∈I sup(ai,b) for all {ai}i∈I and all b.
Remark 5.6. Our reference for lattice theory is Birkhoff, second edition [2].
Our reason for preferring the second edition to the third edition is explained in
[30, Remark 1.5].
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Definition 5.7. A set U ⊆ DT is said to be upwardly closed if degT(g) ∈ U
whenever degT(f) ∈ U for some f ≤T g. Let U(DT) be the set of upwardly
closed subsets of DT. We partially order U(DT) by the subset relation: U ≤ V
if and only if U ⊆ V . Clearly U(DT) is a complete and completely distributive
lattice. To prove this, one uses only the fact that DT is a poset.
Theorem 5.8. The posets Dw and U(DT) are dually isomorphic. That is, there
is an order-reversing one-to-one correspondence between Dw and U(DT).
Proof. Define Ψ : U(DT) → Dw by letting Ψ(U) = degw({f | degT(f) ∈ U})
for all U ∈ U(DT). It is straightforward to verify that Ψ is one-to-one, onto,
and order-reversing, i.e., U ⊆ V if and only if Ψ(U) ≥ Ψ(V ). In proving these
properties, one uses only the fact that ≤T is reflexive and transitive on NN.
Corollary 5.9. Dw is a complete and completely distributive lattice. The
lattice operations in Dw are given by
sup(a,b) = Ψ(Ψ−1(a) ∩Ψ−1(b)) , inf(a,b) = Ψ(Ψ−1(a) ∪Ψ−1(b)) ,
sup
i∈I
ai = Ψ
(⋂
i∈I
Ψ−1(ai)
)
, inf
i∈I
ai = Ψ
(⋃
i∈I
Ψ−1(ai)
)
where Ψ is as in the proof of Theorem 5.8. Moreover, the top degree in Dw is
∞ = Ψ(∅) = degw(∅) and the bottom degree in Dw is 0 = Ψ(DT) = degw({f | f
is computable}).
Definition 5.10. We define the Muchnik topos to be the sheaf model Sh(DT).
Here DT is a poset space as usual, with the Alexandrov topology, where the
open sets are the upward closed subsets of DT.
Remark 5.11. Our terminology “the Muchnik topos” is motivated by Theorem
5.8. Note that set Ω of truth values in Sh(DT) is just U(DT). Moreover, the
propositional connectives of Section 2 correspond via Ψ to lattice operations
in the Muchnik lattice Dw. Namely, for all L(µ)-sentences A and B, letting
Ψ(JAK) = a and Ψ(JBK) = b we have
Ψ(JA ∧BK) = sup(a,b), Ψ(JA ∨BK) = inf(a,b),
Ψ(JA⇒ BK) = imp(a,b) = inf{c | sup(a, c) ≥ b},
Ψ(J¬AK) = imp(a,∞).
Moreover, Sh(DT, µ) |= A ⇒ B if and only if a ≥ b, i.e., JAK ⊆ JBK, and
Sh(DT, µ) |= B if and only if b = 0, i.e., JBK = DT. Thus the Muchnik
topos Sh(DT) provides a natural extension of Muchnik’s Dw interpretation of
intuitionistic propositional calculus [24, Section 1] to intuitionistic higher-order
logic. See also our translation of [24] in the Appendix below.
Theorem 5.12. The Muchnik topos Sh(DT) satisfies AC(σ, τ) wheneverMσ is
a simple sheaf. In particular, Sh(DT) satisfies AC(σ, τ) for Mσ = RC .
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Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.8 and Corollary 4.13 sinceDT is a poset.
Theorem 5.13. In the Muchnik topos Sh(DT), the Cauchy reals RC and
the Dedekind reals RD are Q-isomorphic to each other and to Co(DT,R) =
Clco (DT,R) = C
c
o(DT,R).
Proof. This follows from Corollary 4.14 because DT is a directed poset.
5.2 The Muchnik reals
Definition 5.14. Let # : Q→ N be a standard Go¨del numbering of the rational
numbers. For instance, we could define #(q) for q ∈ Q by
#(q) =

1 if q = 0,
2 · 3a · 5b if q = a/b where a, b ∈ N \ {0} and gcd(a, b) = 1,
4 · 3a · 5b if q = −a/b where a, b ∈ N \ {0} and gcd(a, b) = 1.
For real numbers x ∈ R we define the Turing degree of x to be degT(x) =
degT(fx) where fx ∈ N
N is given by fx(i) = 1 if i = #(q) for some q ∈ Q such
that q < x, otherwise fx(i) = 0, for all i ∈ N.
Definition 5.15. In Sh(DT), the Muchnik reals are the sections of the sheaf
RM = {a ∈ Cco(DT,R) | ∀d (d ∈ dom(a)⇒ degT(a(d)) ≤ d)}.
For a ∈ RM such that a 6= ∅, let a ∈ R be such that rng(a) = {a}, and let
â = the maximal c ∈ RM such that a ≤ c, i.e., the unique â ∈ RM such that
rng(â) = {a} and dom(â) = the Turing upward closure of {degT(a)}. For a = ∅
let â = ∅ and let a be undefined. Note that ∅ 6= a ≤ b implies a = b and â = b̂.
Remark 5.16. As we know from Theorem 5.13, the Cauchy reals RC and
the Dedekind reals RD are represented in Sh(DT) by Cco(DT,R), the sheaf of
constant functions from upward closed sets of Turing degrees into R. However,
not all such constant functions are Muchnik reals. The Muchnik reals are those
a ∈ Cco(DT,R) such that either a = ∅ or dom(a) ⊆ the upward closure of
{degT(a)} where rng(a) = {a}. Thus RM is a proper subsheaf of C
c
o(DT,R), so
RM 6∼=Q RC ∼=Q RD. Informally, a Muchnik real is a real number which “comes
into existence” only when we have enough Turing oracle power to compute it.
5.3 A bounding principle for the Muchnik reals
By Theorem 5.12 the Muchnik topos Sh(DT) satisfies a choice principle for RC ,
the Cauchy reals. In this subsection we prove that for RM , the Muchnik reals,
Sh(DT) satisfies not only a choice principle but also a bounding principle.
Definition 5.17. Let r, s, t be closed terms of sort σ where Mσ = RM . Then
a, b, c ∈ RM where a = JrK, b = JsK, c = JtK. We define Jr ≤T sK = E(a) ∩ E(b)
if a, b 6= ∅ and a ≤T b, otherwise Jr ≤T sK = ∅. We define Jr ≤T (s, t)K =
E(a) ∩ E(b) ∩ E(c) if a, b, c 6= ∅ and a ≤T (b, c), otherwise Jr ≤T (s, t)K = ∅.
Our bounding principle BP(σ, σ) for the Muchnik reals is
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(∀x∃y A(x, y))⇒ ∃z ∀x∃y (y ≤T (x, z) ∧ A(x, y))
where x, y, z are variables of sort σ and A(x, y) is any L-formula which does not
contain z.
Theorem 5.18. The Muchnik topos Sh(DT) satisfies a combined choice and
bounding principle ACBP(σ, σ) for the Muchnik reals,
(∀x∃y A(x, y))⇒ ∃w ∃z ∀x (wx ≤T (x, z) ∧ A(x,wx))
where x, y, z are variables of sort σ, w is a variable of sort σ → σ, A(x, y) is any
L-formula which does not contain z or w, and Mσ = RM .
Proof. We may safely assume that A(x, y) has no free variables other than x and
y. Letting U = J∀x∃y A(x, y)K and V = J∃w ∃z ∀x (wx ≤T (x, z) ∧ A(x,wx))K,
it will suffice to show that U ⊆ V . Fix c = ĉ 6= ∅ in RM such that E(c) ⊆ U . It
will suffice to show that E(c) ⊆ V .
For each a 6= ∅ in RM we have degT((a, c)) ∈ E(â) ∩ E(c) = E(â ↿ E(c)) ⊆
E(c) ⊆ U , so choose b ∈ RM depending only on a such that degT((a, c)) ∈
E(b)∩ JA(â ↿ E(c), b)K. We then have b ≤T (a, c) and E(b) ⊇ E(â)∩E(c), so by
Theorem 2.21 it follows that E(a) ∩E(c) ⊆ Jb ≤T (a, c)K ∩ JA(a, b)K. Moreover,
since b depends only on a, we have a sheaf morphism
RM ↿ E(c)
ϕ
→ RM ↿ E(c)
where ϕ(a ↿ E(c)) = b ↿ E(a) ∩ E(c) for all a ∈ RM . Thus (ϕ,E(c)) ∈ R
RM
M
and J(ϕ,E(c))aK = b ↿ E(a) ∩E(c), so by Theorem 2.21 we have E(a)∩E(c) ⊆
J(ϕ,E(c))a ≤T (a, c)K ∩ JA(a, (ϕ,E(c))a)K. Since this holds for all a ∈ RM , we
now see that E(c) ⊆ V , and the proof is complete.
Corollary 5.19. Sh(DT) satisfies AC(σ, σ) and BP(σ, σ) for Mσ = RM .
Proof. Within the formal system IHOL, AC(σ, σ) and BP(σ, σ) are logical con-
sequences of ACBP(σ, σ). Therefore, the corollary follows from Theorems 5.18
and 2.20. More details may be found in [1, pages 99–106].
Remark 5.20. In our proof of Theorem 5.18, one may avoid using the axiom of
choice, as follows. First, given a 6= ∅ in RM , let ea be the smallest index e ∈ N
of a partial recursive functional Φe such that Φe((a, c)) = b for some b ∈ RM
such that degT((a, c)) ∈ E(b) ∩ JA(â ↿ E(c), b)K. Then, choose b = b̂.
Theorem 5.21. Sh(DT) satisfies AC(σ, τ) for Mσ = RM and Mτ arbitrary.
Proof. Repeat the proof of Theorem 5.18 but skip the parts that involve≤T.
Remark 5.22. Theorem 5.21 resembles Theorem 5.12. However, Theorem
5.12 applies only when Mσ is a simple sheaf, while in Theorem 5.21 we have
Mσ = RM which is not a simple sheaf. See also Remark 3.10.
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Appendix: translation of Muchnik’s paper
In this appendix we offer a translation of Muchnik’s paper [24]. We started
with a rough translation produced in 1964 by the United States Department of
Commerce [25]. We have corrected some typographical and translation errors
and updated some bibliographical references.
Siberian Mathematical Journal
Vol. IV, No. 6, November–December, 1963
A. A. Muchnik
Strong and weak reducibility of algorithmic problems
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Introduction
The abstract (arithmetical) analysis of algorithmic problems was initiated by S.
Kleene and E. Post [1, 2]. E. Post introduced the concept of degree of unsolvabil-
ity of a problem, while Kleene and Post investigated in [2] the class of degrees
of unsolvability of arithmetical (in the sense of Go¨del) sets. Papers along the
same line were published subsequently.
The traditional algorithmic problems of algebra, number theory, topology,
and mathematical logic were problems of solvability. This explains the predom-
inant interest shown first in problems of solvability of arithmetic (i.e., problems
of solvability of sets of natural numbers). Subsequently, however, in logic and
its applications, problems arose connected to separability, enumerability, and
isomorphism of sets [3, 4, 5, 8].
The definition of an algorithmic problem in abstract algorithm theory was
formulated by Yu. T. Medvedev, in which all the previously known cases and
many others were treated [3]. The problem of constructing an arithmetical func-
tion1 satisfying certain conditions is called a Medvedev problem (M-problem).
To each M-problem P there corresponds a family of functions satisfying the
conditions of the problem. Conversely, any family of functions A defines some
M-problem P (A). The functions contained in the family corresponding to an
M-problem P are called the solution functions of the M-problem P .
To each M-problem there corresponds a certain degree of difficulty (an exact
definition of degrees of difficulty is given below). It is possible to define in a
natural fashion conjunction, disjunction, and other operations of propositional
calculus on the degrees of difficulty. As was established by Yu. T. Medvedev,
the calculus of M-problems is an interpretation of constructive propositional
calculus. This is to be expected, since the calculus of M-problems is an elabo-
ration of A. N. Kolmogorov’s calculus of problems (see [7]). The definition of
reducibility of a family of functions (M-problems), which is basic in the calculus
of M-problems, has a constructive character.
Definition 1. An M-problem P (A) (family A) is reducible to an M-problem
P (B) (family B), if there exists a general method of transformation of any
solution of the M-problem P (B) into a solution of the M-problem P (A), or
more accurately, if there exists a partial recursive operator T , which transforms
each function f from the family B into some function g (which depends on f)
from the family A, g = T [f ]. The reducibility of the family A (M-problem P (A)
to P (B)) to B is denoted by A ≤ B (P (A) ≤ P (B)). The family of functions
A (the M-problem P (A))2 is called solvable, if it contains at least one general
recursive function. The M-problems (families) A and B are called equivalent
(A ≈ B) if they are reducible to each other.
The class of M-problems equivalent to an M-problem A is called the degree
of difficulty of the M-problem A and is denoted by a = |A|. The degrees of
1I.e., a function defined on the natural numbers N and assuming values from N, which
includes also 0.
2The definitions presented here apply equally well to families of functions and to the M-
problems which they define.
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difficulty form a partially ordered set Ω: |A| = a ≤ b = |B| if the M-problem A
is reducible to B. Ω is a distributive lattice with implication and has a largest
and a smallest element (see [3]). The investigation of M-problems, initiated by
Yu. T. Medvedev, was continued by the author in [4].
Section 1
1. We describe here a second approach to the concept of reducibility of algorith-
mic problems, corresponding to classical, i.e., non-constructive, formulations.
Along with the problem of constructing an algorithm which solves a certain
problem, it is possible to consider the problem of the existence of a required
algorithm, without insisting on its concrete form. Then each condition imposed
on the arithmetical functions (i.e., each family of functions) will be linked to
two problems:
1. The problem of constructing one of the functions of this family: the M-
problem.
2. The problem of proving the existence of a general recursive function in
this family.3
Problems of the second type will be called Ex-problems. There is a pair-
wise one-to-one correspondence between the classes of families of functions,
M-problems, and Ex-problems. The Ex-problem corresponding to the family
of functions A (M-problem P (A)) will be denoted by P (A) = Q(A). The func-
tions of the family defining the Ex-problem Q will accordingly be called the
solution functions of the Ex-problem Q. An Ex-problem is called solvable if its
solution functions include a general recursive one.
An important method of establishing the solvability of an algorithmic prob-
lem A is to reduce this problem to a different problem B, the solvability of
which has already been established. Conversely, the unsolvability of a problem
A implies the unsolvability of any problem B to which problem A is reducible.
Definition 2. The Ex-problem P (A) (family of functions A) is weakly reducible
to the Ex-problem P (B) (family B) (A ⊳ B), if for any function f of the family
B (f ∈ B) there exists a partial recursive operator T , which transforms the
function f into the function g of the family A (g ∈ A).
The choice of the function f governs here not only g but also the operator
T = Tf . In this case we say that the problem P (A) (family A) reduces weakly
to the problem P (B) (family B) by means of the operators {Tf}.
The reducibility of families of functions (problems) in the sense of Medvedev’s
definition will be called henceforth strong reducibility (or simply reducibility).
Inasmuch as each of the three objects: the family of functions, the M-
problem, and the Ex-problem, defines uniquely the two others, we shall hence-
forth identify these objects and call them problems.
3It is easy to see here an analogy with the question of the existence of a solution of a
differential equation and the problem of effectively finding a solution.
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2. A natural question arises concerning the relation between these types of
reducibility. It is clear that strong reducibility of a problem A to a problem
B implies weak reducibility of A to B. As shown by the example considered
below, the converse is generally not true.
Let the problem A be determined by a family consisting of one non-recursive
function f , A = Kf = {f}, and let problem B be determined by a family
consisting of all the functions obtained from f in the following manner: for each
tuple of natural numbers n = {n1, . . . , ns} we consider the function fn(m):
fn(m) =
{
ni+1 for 0 ≤ i < s,
f(i− s) for i ≥ s,
i.e., we “place in front” of the sequence of values {f(i)} the tuple n:
B = K ′f = {fn}.
It is easy to see that the problem Kf reduces weakly to the problem K
′
f :
Kf ⊳ K
′
f .
For any function fn ∈ B there exists a partial recursive operator (p.r.o.) T
which transforms fn into f (by “discarding” the first s values of fn, where
n = {n1, n2, . . . , ns}).
However, the problem A does not strongly reduce to the problem B.
Let us assume the opposite, i.e., that there exists a p.r.o. T which transforms
any function fn into f . Any p.r.o. T can be specified by means of a recursive
sequence of pairs of tuples (see [4, 10])
{(dw, d
′
w)}, w = 0, 1, 2, . . . .
If the sequence of several first values of the function h forms a tuple d, then we
call d a tuple of the function h. We shall also say that the function h begins
with the tuple d. If h = T [e] and dw is a tuple of the function e, then d
′
w is
a tuple of the function h. Inasmuch as T [fdw ] = f and dw is a tuple of the
function fdw , then d
′
w is a tuple of the function f (for each w). In view of the
fact that {d′w} is a recursive sequence of tuples, the length of which is unlimited
(in the aggregate), the function f is recursive, yet we have assumed it to be
non-recursive. This contradiction proves that the problem A does not reduce
strongly to B.
In the foregoing example, the problem B was chosen somewhat artificially.
For algorithmic problems which are usually considered in the theory of algo-
rithms and its applications, the situation is different. If we confine ourselves to
reducibility (strong and weak) by means of general recursive operators4 or even
partial recursive operators applicable to each solution function of the problem to
which we reduce another problem, then both types of reducibility are equivalent
4A general recursive operator is a p.r.o. which transforms functions which are everywhere
defined (on N) into functions which are everywhere defined.
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for a broad class of problems. We shall return to this question in Section 2, and
consider here in greater detail the calculus that results from the definition of
weak reducibility of problems.
3. If problems A and B reduce weakly to each other, we shall call them
weakly equivalent : A ⊢⊣ B. This relation is transitive, symmetrical, and re-
flexive. The class of all problems therefore breaks up into classes of weakly
equivalent problems. The class of problems which are weakly equivalent to A
will be called the weak degree of difficulty of problem A. The weak degree of
difficulty of the problem A characterizes the problem of proving the existence
(in the classical sense) of a computable solution function of the problem A.
A weak degree of difficulty b exceeds a, b ≥ a or a ≤ b, if the problem A
reduces weakly to the problem B (a = |A|, b = |B|). We denote by Ω the
partially ordered set of weak degrees of difficulty.
Between Ω and Ω there is a one-sidedly univalent correspondence Ω→ Ω; to
each degree of difficulty a ∈ Ω there corresponds a weak degree of difficulty a:
a is the weak degree of difficulty of a problem A with degree of difficulty a. The
correspondence a → a does not depend on the choice of the problem A, since
equivalence of problems implies weak equivalence of problems. This relation is
isotopic, since reducibility of problems implies weak reducibility. The solvable
(smallest) degree 0 from Ω corresponds to the solvable weak degree 0 from Ω,
and the improper (largest, i.e., defined by the empty class of functions) degree
∞ from Ω corresponds to an equal degree from Ω. We shall prove that Ω is a
lattice and the indicated correspondence is a lattice homomorphism.
We note that Ω admits a natural topological interpretation. Define a com-
plete family of functions or points of Baire space (complete problem) to be any
family (problem) A having the following property: together with each function
f belonging to A, the family A contains any function g with respect to which
the function f is recursive.
We shall establish some properties of complete families. The union and inter-
section of any number of complete families (finite or infinite) are also complete
families.
Let B be some family of functions. The family consisting of all functions
{g}, for each of which there exists a certain function f from B, which is recursive
with respect to this function g will be called the completion B′ of the family
B. It is obvious that B′ is the smallest complete family containing the family
B, and the completion of a complete family A coincides with A: A′ = A. The
family B′ is weakly equivalent to B. It is sufficient to establish that B′ E B,
since B′ ⊃ B, from which follows B E B′. Indeed, for any function g ∈ B′ there
exists a p.r.o. T such that T [g] = f ∈ B.
Completions of two weakly equivalent families A and B coincide: A ⊢⊣ B →
A′ = B′. Let g ∈ A′. Then there exists a function f ∈ A and a p.r.o. T1 such that
T1[g] = f . In view of A ⊢⊣ B, there exists a p.r.o. T such that T [f ] = h ∈ B.
Then T2[g] = T [T1[g]] = h ∈ B. Therefore g ∈ B′. Conversely, if g ∈ B′, then
g ∈ A′. Thus A′ = B′.
In view of the foregoing, any weak degree a defines uniquely a complete
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family (problem) A, which we shall call the representative of a.
Lemma. Let a and b be weak degrees of complete families A and B respectively.
Then a ≥ b↔ A ⊂ B 5, or using a different notation
A D B ↔ A ⊂ B. (1)
Let g ∈ A. Then there exists a p.r.o. T such that T [g] = f ∈ B. In view
of the completeness of the family B, g ∈ B. The relation A ⊂ B → A D B is
obvious.
We now readily prove some theorems concerning the properties of Ω.
Theorem 1. For any set of weak degrees {aξ} there exist exact upper and
lower bounds, denoted by
∨
aξ and
∧
aξ, respectively.
Let Aξ be a complete family with weak degree of difficulty aξ and A =
⋃
ξ
Aξ,
a = |A|. We shall prove that a = inf{aξ}. Obviously A is a complete family and
a ≤ aξ for any ξ. Further, let b ≤ aξ for any ξ and B a complete family, b = |B|.
Then B ⊃ Aξ and B ⊃ A, hence b ≤ a. We put A∗ =
⋂
ξ
Aξ. Obviously, a
∗ ≥ aξ
for any ξ. In addition, if b ≥ aξ for all ξ, and B is a representative of b, then
B ⊂ Aξ and B ⊂
⋂
ξ
Aξ = A
∗, i.e., b ≥ a∗. Hence a∗ = sup{aξ}.
From the proof of Theorem 1, we see that the operations of taking the exact
upper and lower bounds in Ω correspond to the operations of intersection and
union of complete families of functions.
Ω is a complete lattice, represented by subsets of the Baire space J . In the
function space J it is possible to introduce a topology by assigning as open sets
the complete families of functions. This will be a T0 space. (On this subject see
G. D. Birkhoff, Lattice theory, Russian translation of the 2nd edition, IL 1952,
Chapter IV, §§ 1 and 2.)
Theorem 2. Let A and B be arbitrary problems, a = |A|, a = |B|, b = |B|, b =
|B|. Then the problem C = A∪B with degree of difficulty c = a∨ b has a weak
degree c = a ∨ b, and the problem D with degree of difficulty d = a ∧ b has a
weak degree d = a ∧ b.
Following Yu. T. Medvedev [3], we choose problems C and D in the following
fashion. We define the p.r.o.s R0, R1 and a two-place p.r.o. R:
fi(n) = Ri[f ],
fi(n) =
{
i for n = 0
f(n− 1) for n > 0
}
(i = 0, 1),
h(n) = R[f(m), g(m)],
h(n) =
{
f(m) for n = 2m,
g(m) for n = 2m+ 1.
5A ↔ B denotes that the statement A is equivalent to statement B.
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The problem C consists of all the functions f0(n) = R0[f ], where f ∈ A, and
all the functions g1(n) = R1[g], where g ∈ B, and |C| = c = a∨ b. The problem
C1 consists of all the solution functions of problems A and B,
|c1| = c = a ∨ b.
We shall prove that C and C1 are weakly equivalent, i.e., |C1| = |C|. Indeed,
each function h ∈ C1 can be transformed with the aid of R0 or R1 into a
function hi ∈ C, and each function hi ∈ C can be reduced by means of an
inverse transformation into h ∈ C1 (i.e., C1 reduces even strongly to C).
Further, the problem D consists of all the functions h = R[f, g], where f
runs through class A and g through class B. The problem D1 consists of all the
functions e such that problems A and B reduce to the problem of computability
Ae = {e}, i.e., for each function e there exists p.r.o. T1 and T2 such that T1[e] ∈
A, T2[e] ∈ B. We shall prove that problems D and D1 are weakly equivalent:
1. D1 E D (even D1 ≤ D). The relation D1 ≤ D follows from the fact that
class D is contained in D1, since any function h ∈ D can be transformed
with the aid of the p.r.o. T1 (T2) into the function f(g), f ∈ A (g ∈ B).
To this end it is sufficient to put
T1[h] = f(m) = h(2m),
T2[h] = g(m) = h(2m+ 1).
2. D E D1. Let the function e ∈ D1. Then there exist p.r.o. T1 and T2 such
that
f = T1[e] ∈ A, g = T2[e] ∈ B, R[f, g] = h ∈ D
and
h = T [e] = R [T1[e], T2[e]] ∈ D.
The p.r.o. T transforms the function e into h ∈ D, from which it follows
that D E D1.
The weak degree c = a ∨ b will be called the disjunction, and d = a ∧ b will
be called the conjunction, of the weak degrees a and b. Let us prove that the
lattice Ω has an implication operator:
Theorem 3. For any weak degrees a and b there exists a smallest degree c∗ in
the class of weak degrees c such that a ∧ c ≥ b.
Proof. We consider the representatives of the weak degrees a and b, i.e., the
complete families (problems) A and B, |A| = a, |B| = b. We denote by C∗ the
family of all the functions {g} such that for each pair of functions [f, g], where
f ∈ A and g ∈ C∗, there exist a p.r.o. T which transforms the pair [f, g] into a
function e ∈ B, e = T [f, g]. It is obvious that the family C∗ includes the family
B and that a ∧ c∗ ≥ b where c∗ = |C
∗
|. Let us prove that the problem C∗
reduces weakly to any problem C such that a ∧ c ≥ b where c = |C|. Let C be
such a problem and g an arbitrary function from C. As follows from Theorem
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2, the problem D, which consists of all of the functions h = R[f, g] where f
runs through the family A and g through the family C, has the weak degree
d = a∧c. Inasmuch as d ≥ b, i.e., |D| E |B|, for any function h ∈ D, there exists
a p.r.o. T1 such that e = T1[h] ∈ B. This means that for any pair of functions
[f, g] where f ∈ A and g ∈ C, there exists a two-place p.r.o. T = T1R such
that e = T [f, g] = T1[R[f, g]] ∈ B. By definition of C∗, the function g ∈ C∗. It
follows therefore that C ⊂ C∗ and |C∗| E |C|. This completes the proof.
We shall call C∗ the weak problem of reducibility of the problem B to the
problem A, and c∗ the implication, denoted by a ⊃ b. Obviously C∗ is a
complete family, i.e., the representative of c∗.
We note that implication, generally speaking, is not conserved in homomor-
phism of the lattices Ω→ Ω. Indeed, in the example discussed in Section 2, the
problems A and B (A = Kf , B = K
′
f ) were related by |A| > |B| and |A| ⊢⊣ |B|,
or a > b and a = b. Therefore the implication b ⊃ a is the solvable (trivial)
weak degree (i.e., the degree of a solvable problem), and b ⊃ a is an unsolvable
degree and b ⊃ a 6= b ⊃ a.
Note that solvability of the weak degree a ⊃ b is equivalent to the relation
a ≥ b. The proof of this is simple and will be omitted. Further consideration of
this point is analogous to that of Yu. T. Medvedev with respect to the calculus
of Ω.
We consider an arbitrary segment Ω : 0 ≤ x ≤ d. The weak degree ¬x =
x ⊃ d is called the negation of the weak degree x (with respect to d). We
introduce also the notation a ∼ b for the degree (a ⊃ b) ∩ (b ⊃ a).
The thought arises of the connection between the calculus of weak degrees
Ω and the propositional calculus: elementary propositions can be interpreted
as weak degrees, and the operations of propositional calculus correspond to like
operations of the calculus of weak degrees. The truth of a formula corresponds
to the solvability of a weak degree.
Theorem 4. All the axioms and rules of derivation of intuitionistic proposi-
tional calculus are satisfied for weak degrees of an arbitrary segment 0 ≤ x ≤ d
in Ω.
Theorem 4 follows from the existence of implication in the distributive lattice
Ω (see Birkhoff, Lattice theory, Russian translation of the 2nd edition, Chapter
XII, §7).
Let us discuss the consequences of this point. In spite of the fact that
the definition of weak reducibility of problems has been chosen in accordance
with classical premises, the calculus of weak degrees obtained thereby is an
interpretation of constructive propositional calculus and does not include, for
example, the law of the excluded third.
However, this should not surprise us, since the calculus of weak degrees Ω,
like that of Ω, is a refinement of Kolmogorov’s calculus of problems.
The question whether the weak degrees Ω are an exact6 interpretation of
6An interpretation of a logical calculus K is called exact if all formulas true (solvable,
realizable) in the interpretation are derivable in the calculus K.
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constructive propositional calculus remains open. We note that the calculus
of degrees of difficulty Ω, as shown recently by Yu. T. Medvedev, is an exact
interpretation of the constructive calculus.
Section 2
In this section we analyze the question of the relation between strong and weak
reducibility under certain limitations on the p.r.o.s by means of which the re-
ducibility is realized, and on the problems themselves.
We need several new concepts. In the arguments that follow we shall find it
convenient to use the Baire space J .
Arithmetical functions can be interpreted as points in Baire space (consid-
ering the sequence of the values of these functions [9, 10]). To each problem A
in such an interpretation, there corresponds a certain set of points MA of the
Baire space, which defines it completely.
Let δn be a Baire interval, defined by a tuple n = (n1, n2, . . . , ns). The
problem which is defined by the set of points MA∩δn shall be called the interval
An of the problem A. In other words, An is defined by the class of solution
functions of the problem A beginning with the tuple n. The interval An is called
non-empty if the set MA ∩ δn is non-empty. A problem A is called uniform if
any of its non-empty intervals is (strongly) reducible to it.
The problem of solvability AE of the set E is defined by the class KA(E),
consisting of one characteristic function of the set E. The problem of enumer-
ability C(E) is determined by the class KC(E) = {f(n)} of the functions that
enumerate the set E, i.e., the set E is the image of the function f(n). The
problem of separability AE0E1 of the sets E0 and E1 with empty intersection is
determined by the class of functions {f(n)} satisfying the condition
f(k) =

0 for k ∈ E0,
1 for k ∈ E1,
0 or 1 for k /∈ E0 ∪ E1
(1)
Theorem 5. The problem of enumerability of any non-empty set E is uniform.
Indeed, let C be the problem of enumerability of the set E and let Cn be
a non-empty interval in it: n = (n1, n2, . . . , ns). Thus KCn consists of all the
functions which enumerate the set E and begin with the tuple n. The problem
Cn is (strongly) reducible to the problem C by means of the p.r.o. T which,
being applied to any function f , shifts the sequence of its values by first adding
the tuple n.
Theorem 6. The problem of separability AE0E1 is uniform for arbitrary E0, E1
(E0 ∩ E1 = Λ, where Λ is the empty set).
We denote the problem AE0E1 by A. Let An be a non-empty interval of the
problem A, n = (n1, n2, . . . , ns). It is obvious that
nk =
 0 for k ∈ E0,1 for k ∈ E1,
0 or 1 for k /∈ E0 ∪ E1
 , (k = 1, 2, . . . , s) (2)
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The problem An is (strongly) reducible to the problem A by means of the
p.r.o. T which replaces the first s values of any function by the tuple n. If f(k)
is a solution function of the problem A, then it satisfies the condition (1). But
then the function g = T [f ] also satisfies the condition (1), as follows from (2)
and from the definition of the p.r.o. T . In addition, the function g begins with
the tuple n and hence is a solution function of the M-problem An, which was
to be proved.
The problem of continuation of the partial7 function f(m) is the problem Bf
defined by the class of functions (which are defined everywhere on N) coinciding
with the function f(m) wherever the latter is defined. (We shall call such
functions continuations of f(m).) We note that a problem of separability is a
particular case of a problem of continuation. Obviously we have:
Theorem 7. The problem of continuation of any partial function is uniform.
The proof of Theorem 7 is analogous to the proof of Theorem 6.
Inasmuch as the p.r.o.s used in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are general
recursive, each problem of enumerability or separability reduces to any of its
non-empty intervals by means of a general recursive operator. Problems pos-
sessing this property will be called general recursively uniform. In addition to
problems of enumerability and separability, problems of solvability are also gen-
eral recursively uniform, since the operator of identical transformation reduces
any function to itself.
An example of a non-uniform problem is the problem defined by the class
K = {f, g}, where the degree of non-computability of the function f is strictly
greater than the degree of non-computability of the function g.
We shall call the problem B closed if it corresponds to a closed set of points
MB of the Baire space J . Obviously, solvability problems are closed.
Theorem 8. The continuation problem of any partial function is closed.
Let {gk(m)} be a convergent sequence of continuations of the function f(m),
and let g(m) = lim
k→∞
gk(m). We shall prove that g(m) also continues f(m). If
the function f(m) is defined for m = m0, then gk(m0) = f(m0) for all k.
Consequently g(m0) = f(m0), as was to be proved.
Corollary. Any problem of separability is closed.
Theorem 9. The problem of enumerability C(E) of any set E containing more
than one element is not closed.
Let a ∈ E and let the function f(m) enumerate the set E. We define the
sequence of functions {fk(m)} enumerating the set E:
fk(m) =
{
a for m < k,
f(m− k) for m ≥ k.
7I.e., perhaps not everywhere defined.
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Obviously
lim
k→∞
fk(m) = g(m) ≡ a.
In view of the fact that the set E \ {a} is not empty, g(m) is not a solution
function of the problem C(E), and consequently the problem C(E) is not closed.
However, it is possible to generalize the concept of closedness of a problem in
such a way that enumerability problems as well as many other problems which
are of interest for the recursive theory of sets are included. This concept is
closely related with the theory of infinite games [11].
Let S be a set of points of the Baire space J . We imagine two players I and II
who move alternately, and their moves consist of choosing Baire intervals which
intersect with the set S. Player I chooses as his first move the Baire interval
δ1, which intersects with S. If player I chose in move m the Baire interval δm,
then player II chooses in the mth move a sub-interval8 δ∗m of the interval δm
intersecting with S. Then player I chooses in the (m+1)st move a sub-interval
δm+1 of the interval δ
∗
m intersecting with S. Let us assume that after the mth
move of player I (II) the play is in the interval δm (δ
∗
m). We agree that at the
beginning the game is in the interval δ0 = J . Player II wins if the sequence of
intervals
δ0 ⊃ δ1 ⊃ δ
∗
1 ⊃ δ2 ⊃ δ
∗
2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ δm ⊃ δ
∗
m ⊃ δm+1 . . .
contracts to a point of the set S. Otherwise, player I wins.
We fix once and for all some effective numbering of the Baire intervals by
means of natural numbers. By a strategy of a player we mean a function r = ϕ(n)
which indicates for each interval with number n the number r of a sub-interval
of it. If the game is in the interval numbered n, then the player making the next
move chooses the interval with number ϕ(n). The strategy ϕ is called correct
with respect to the set S if for any interval numbered n intersecting with S,
the interval numbered ϕ(n) also intersects with S. We shall henceforth take
strategy to mean a strategy which is correct with respect to the considered set.
A strategy is called winning (for the set S) if player II, using this strategy, wins
for any correct strategy of his opponent. A set S is called winning if there exists
a winning strategy for this set. The M-problem A(S) and the class of functions
K(S) defined by the set S will also be called winning in this case.
A set S (a problem A(S)) the complement of which is nowhere dense is called
trivially winning. In order to win, it is sufficient for player II to choose as his
first move an interval which is completely contained in S, which is possible since
the complement CS is nowhere dense.
If neither the set S nor its complement CS is trivially winning (or equiva-
lently, neither S nor CS is nowhere dense), then they cannot be simultaneously
winning. In fact, let S be a winning set and ϕ(n) its winning strategy. Let us
consider the game with respect to CS. Player I chooses as his first move an
interval in which the set S is everywhere dense (such an interval exists, since S
is not a set which is nowhere dense). Then player I applies strategy ϕ(n). For
8We consider Baire sub-intervals which are proper parts of their intervals.
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any strategy of player II, the sequence of intervals in which the game is situated
will contract to a point belonging to S, i.e., player II loses.
An example of a winning set (problem) is a closed set S (problem A(S)).
In this case the sequence of intervals {δm, δ∗m} contracts always to a point of S.
It follows therefore that problems of solvability and separability are winning.
There exist also non-closed winning problems.
Theorem 10. Any problem of enumerability is a winning problem.
Let GF be the problem of enumerability of a set F of natural numbers, and
letM be the corresponding subset of J . Player II chooses a strategy r = ϕ(n) in
the following manner: let n be the number of an interval δn = (n1, n2, . . . , ns)
containing points in M, by virtue of which n1, n2, . . . , nl ∈ F . We denote
by nl+1 the smallest number belonging to the set F which is not equal to ni
for i = 1, 2, . . . , l, and if there is no such number, then nl+1 = nl. We put
δϕ(n) = (n1, n2, . . . , nl, nl+1). Obviously δϕ(n) intersects with M. We consider
the sequence of intervals in which the game occurs:
δ1, δ
∗
1 , . . . , δm, δ
∗
m, . . . .
We note that: (1) for each m, all of the numbers of the tuples9
δm = (n1, n2, . . . , np) and δ
∗
m = (n1, n2, . . . , np∗)
belong to F ; (2) any number q ∈ F will be sooner or later encountered in the
tuples {δm, δ∗m}, because going from δm to δ
∗
m we add a still unchosen element
of the set F (if it exists). But then the sequence {δm, δ∗m} contracts to the point
b = (n1, n2, n3, . . . , nl, . . .) where the set {ni} coincides with F , i.e., b ∈ M.
This proves the theorem.
A partial recursive operator T is called fully applicable to a problem B if it
is defined on each solution function of the problem B. The class of all p.r.o.s
which are fully applicable to the problem B will be denoted by QB.
If a problem A reduces strongly (weakly) to a problem B by means of oper-
ators of a certain class P , then we say that A is strongly (weakly) P -reducible
to B.
Let U be some class of p.r.o.s. A problem B is called U -uniform if any of
its non-empty intervals is strongly reducible to it by means of operators of the
class U .
The class of p.r.o.s represented in the form of compositions10 RT [f ] where
R ∈ P and T ∈ U will be denoted by PU .
Theorem 11. Let A be a closed problem, B a U -uniform winning problem,
and P a subclass of QB. If the problem A is weakly P -reducible to the problem
B, then the problem A is strongly PU -reducible to the problem B.
9As is well known, Baire intervals are identified with tuples of natural numbers.
10RT [f ] is the result of successive application of the p.r.o.s R and T to the function f .
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Proof. Let us assume that no operator of class PU reduces the problem A
to the problem B. We arrange all the p.r. operators of the class P in some
sequence
T1, T2, T3, . . . , Ts, . . . .
To each operator Ts there corresponds a continuous function θs in the Baire
space (see [10]) defined at each point of the set MB , by virtue of P ⊂ QB. By
virtue of our assumptions, including continuity of the functions θs and closedness
of the set MA, there exists for each s an interval δ represented by the function
θs in CMA, the complement of MA. Let ϕ be the winning strategy for the set
MB. By the method indicated above, we obtain for T1 an interval δ = δ1. Let
n1 be the number of δ1; let r1 = ϕ(n1); let δ
∗
1 be the interval numbered r1;
let B1 be the problem defined by the set MB ∩ δ∗1 , which is then a non-empty
interval of the problem B.
Inasmuch as the problem B is U -uniform, the problem B1 is strongly U -
reducible to B. But then the problem A cannot be strongly P -reducible to B1,
since in accordance with our assumption the problem A is not strongly PU -
reducible to B. Consequently, there exists a non-empty interval δ2 intersecting
with the set MB and transformed by the function θ2 into a subset of CMA.
Obviously it is possible to choose δ2 so as to make δ2 ⊂ δ∗1 . If n2 is the number
of δ2, then r2 = ϕ(n2) is the number of a sub-interval δ
∗
2 , δ
∗
2 ⊂ δ2, which also
intersects with MB1 . Let B2 be the problem defined by the set
MB1 ∩ δ
∗
2 = MB ∩ δ
∗
2 .
We define further in the same manner the intervals
δ3 ⊃ δ
∗
3 ⊃ δ4 ⊃ δ
∗
4 ⊃ . . .
and the problems B3, B4, . . ..
The problem B, by virtue of U -uniformity, is strongly U -reducible to any
problem Bs, while the problem A does not reduce strongly to Bs by any P -
operator. By virtue of the winning character of the problem B and of the
strategy ϕ, the sequence {δs, δ∗s} contracts to a point f ∈MB.
Inasmuch as for any s the operator Ts transforms the set MBs into a subset
of CMA, we have Ts[f ] = g ∈ CMA for any s, and this means that the problem
A does not reduce weakly to B by means of operators in the class P , which
contradicts the conditions of the theorem. Consequently, the assumption that
the problem A does not reduce strongly to B by means of operators in the class
PU is incorrect. The theorem is proved.
Our desire to be as general as possible has made it necessary to formulate the
theorem in a rather cumbersome manner. We present some simply formulated
corollaries of Theorem 11.
Corollary 1. If a closed problem A reduces weakly to a uniform winning prob-
lem B by means of operators of the class QB, then A reduces strongly to B.
A U -uniform problem is called general recursively uniform if U is the class
of general recursive operators [6, 10]. Problems of solvability, separability, and
enumerability are general recursively uniform.
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Corollary 2. If a closed problem A reduces weakly to a general recursively
uniform problem B by means of general recursive operators, then problem A
reduces strongly to problem B by means of a general recursive operator.
In conclusion, we formulate some unsolved problems.
1. Is it possible to strengthen the fundamental theorem in such a way that
weak reducibility (by means of arbitrary partial recursive operators) of a
closed problem A to a uniform problem B would imply strong reducibility
of A to B?
2. Under what “natural” conditions imposed on problems A and B does weak
reducibility (by means of an arbitrary p.r.o.) imply strong reducibility?
3. What is the situation in the particular case when A is a solvability problem
and B is a separability problem of enumerated recursively inseparable sets
(we note that no non-trivial solvability problem A can be reduced strongly
to a separability problem B [4, 12]).
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